the gens as an institution links motherhood to agriculture and social reproduction, and thus to the production of genealogical and racial inheritance. The writings of scholars Anne Fausto-Sterling and Troy Duster might be valuable additional texts in this section, for both scholars argue-against much work of contemporary population biologists-that race is far more complicated than a simple question of genetics. This would have nuanced an argument that at times seems to rely on a slippage between species and race, or to put it more precisely a conflation of genetic inheritance and racial properties.
Weinbaum's study concludes with a chapter and a coda that emphasize the agency of literature in the reconceptualization of race and reproduction. A meticulous enumeration of the changing conceptions of reproduction in the writings of W .E. B. DuBois demonstrates how the image of black maternity is freighted with contradictory meanings as the author's own commitments shift from nationalism to racial globality, and from biological kinship from cultural belonging. The coda acknowledges that, as DuBois's work demonstrates, it is now possible to decouple race and reproduction, and emphasizes the crucial role played by works of the imagination in making that possibility a reality. Turning to works in the contemporary art exhibition "Gene(sis)," Weinbaum demonstrates how these works by a range of visual and new media artists undermine the fantasy of genealogical control, offering us instead a celebration of the wayward. Indeed, the evocative image of Juror Number 6, "Leopard Spirit," by Daniel Lee, suggests that Weinbaum might productively follow this book with a sequel exploring the role postmodern modes of reproduction are playing in the construction and government of the keyword species in reflexive modernity. But that is for a different book, and perhaps a wayward one.
Reference Trent, James. 1995 
Linda A. Bell
In Visible Identities, Linda Martín Alcoff examines and rebuts some major challenges to identity politics. She focuses on race and gender, identities visibly marked on the body, rather than the more behavioral identities of class and nationality, often very effectively using her own ambiguous Anglo/Latina identity to illuminate her points and arguments. Portions or revised versions of previously published essays are coherently included, illuminating and connecting her years of thinking about racial and gender identities. Before continuing, I must note that I am hardly a disinterested reader of Linda Alcoff's work. Years ago, she was a student in the philosophy department in which I taught. While working on her master's degree, she ably indexed my 1983 anthology of philosophers' statements on women, Visions of Women. Since then, I have tried to keep in touch with her, have followed her illustrious career with interest and enthusiasm, and have learned a great deal from her. That said, I was delighted to see that she still finds useful those remarks about women.
In this book, Alcoff engages not only with current critics of identity politics but also with the history of philosophy and political theory as well as many other recent and current philosophers and theorists. The number and range of those with whom she is in dialogue are indeed impressive and together unfold the historical lineage of the problems she addresses, always careful to offer thoughtful argument when she disagrees and to give generous credit to those from whom she draws more positively. Important, too, is the fact that she frequently illuminates her points with concrete historical events.
In part 1, Alcoff lays out both her understanding of identity politics and a number of critiques, focusing on those developing "the idea that social identity itself is an a priori problem, that identities, under any description, pose dangers and commit one to mistaken assumptions when they are believed to be real and/or acted upon politically." She does so while recognizing that many constructions of identity are problematic because they are "overly homogenizing, essentialist, reductive, or simplistic" (14).
While acknowledging that political challenges to identity come from the entire political spectrum, she concentrates on liberal and leftist opposition and begins by tracing much of the discomfort to classical liberal political theory where "the initial state of the self is conceptualized as an abstract individual without, or prior to, group allegiance" (21). She then discusses Kant's claim that full autonomy requires critical distance from and thus the ability to objectify cultural traditions (22) and shows how his claim continues to affect contemporary views of ethnicity and identity in contemporary theorists such as Arthur M. Schlesinger and Jean Bethke Elshtain. Rather different concerns have been developed by leftist political theorists like Nancy Fraser, who seems to be worried that group identity will undermine progressive struggles and "encourage . . . the reification of group identities" (17). In response, Alcoff cites studies indicating that strongly felt identities do not, in fact, result in the feared "balkanization" or group solipsism. Moreover, she appeals to the more "realistic" support of "cultural citizenship" (as proposed by Renato Rosaldo and developed by the Latino Cultural Studies Working Group), not abstract individual citizens who participate in civil society as rational agents, to make possible effective response to prejudices that confront various individuals when they enter the public arena (40).
In her philosophical critique, Alcoff challenges the view of self and rationality, especially self-Other relations, that she finds in Western philosophy from Plato and Augustine to Descartes and Kant, counterposing Charles Taylor's hermeneutic view in Sources of the Self to other views that recognize some, but not enough, of the complexity found in his view of the self. In this connection, she examines Hegel's early and later recognitions of process and the important but limited role of the Other; Paul Ricoeur, Lorraine Code, and Susan Brison's relational but still restricted accounts of the self; Freud and Lacan's proposed internalization particularly of early Others; Teresa Brennan's more extensive acknowledgment that the self receives its identity from the Other; and Sartre's view of the Other as a threat to the self but as the source of identity for the ego confronted by the for-itself. However, Alcoff regards the latter as Sartre's "true self" and sees it as always escaping the ego by negation, thus reflecting a view of the self as "excess" that she finds again in Judith Butler.
Rather than reified, closed, externally enforced identities, lived as "discrete and stable set(s) of interests," Alcoff proposes identity as a "horizon of agency," as "an opening out, a point from which to see," in which "the Other is internal to the self's substantive content, a part of its own horizon, and thus a part of its own identity" (42-45). Against earlier philosophical discussions of identities and essences, she argues that the social identities in which she is interested are "relational, contextual, and fundamental to the self." In particular, they are fundamental "when they have causal determinacy over our epistemic and political orientations to the world-what we notice, what we care about-but also when they profoundly affect how we are seen and interacted with by others" (89-90).
Alcoff's hermeneutic views of gender and racial identities are fleshed out with the help of Hans-Georg Gadamer, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, George Herbert Mead, Mark Johnson, and George Lakoff; feminist phenomenologists such as Simone de Beauvoir, Iris Young, and Sandra Bartky; Frantz Fanon, Charles Mills, and others; with occasional appeals to concrete experience, such as her fascinating account of an encounter between the Spanish explorers and the Incas (98-99). The last three parts of the book are devoted to showing how her more general analysis applies first to gender identity, then to racialized identity, and finally to what she calls "hybridized" identities.
In applying her hermeneutic understanding to gender identity, Alcoff retraces some of the major disputes within feminist theory. She includes a revised and shortened version of an essay she published in 1988 on the debate over essentialism, arguing that what was rejected in that debate (essentialism and determinism) leaves room for the development of a more positional view of identity. In the next chapter, she argues that a positional view of identity, by acknowledging "that the objective basis of sex categories is in the differential relationship to reproductive capacity between men and women," allows claims to be made about women but avoids the previous flight of some feminists "from realism, naturalism, objectivism, and even the capacity to make truth claims" (153-54).
Given the more superficial nature of the bodily markings as well as "the indeterminacy of racial categories, their fluid borders, arbitrary criteria, and cultural variety," Alcoff rejects the temptation "to adopt a nominalism about race, that race is no more real than phlogiston or witchcraft," on the phenomenological grounds of "the intense present reality of race" (179). She also rejects racial essentialism (the view that "members of racial groups share a set of characteristics, a set of political interests, and a historical destiny") in favor of a subjectivist "contextualism" ("approaches that begin from the lived experience of racialization [and that] can reveal how race is constitutive of bodily experience, subjectivity, judgment, and epistemic relationships" ). This means that "race is a structure of contemporary perception, . . . tacit, almost hidden from view, and thus almost [but not quite] immune from critical reflection," perceptual practices being "dynamic even when congealed into habit" (188-89). While visible differences have been used to naturalize ideologies of race, and even though these differences are "almost laughably insignificant," she nonetheless agrees with Bernita Berry and Patricia Williams that racial color blindness may be, as Williams says, "a legitimate hope for the future" but is at present "an ideological confusion at best, and denial at its very worst" (197, 199) . She later cites with approval Adrienne Rich's rejection of color blindness in a racist society as "white solipsism" and examines ways whites can be disloyal to whiteness without disavowing their own white identity and responsibility .
In the final part of this book, Alcoff looks at "Latino/a Particularity." Here, she observes that Latino/as are homogenized in the United States in a generic way that has nothing to do with ethnicity and is often treated as a racial designation even while racial identities in the various countries brought together under this rubric are ignored along with the fact that this racial designation does not fit well under the pervasive black-white binary. Citing court cases to show the ways this binary has shifted (to include, for example, Chinese Americans and Mexican Americans sometimes as white, sometimes as black, but generally to their disadvantage), she observes that "race is a construction that is variable enough to be stretched opportunistically as the need arises in order to maintain and expand discrimination" and "that the hegemony of the black/white paradigm has stymied the development of an adequate account of the diverse racial realities in the United States and weakened the general accounts of racism that attempt to be truly inclusive" (251, 253). Instead, she suggests something along the lines of David Theo Goldberg's "ethnorace," to remind us that, in the case of many, such as Latinos, ethnicity and race are vitally connected.
Maintaining that racisms must always be discussed in the plural, Alcoff considers the way mixed-race identity plays out, rejecting as strategies for undermining racisms the concept of assimilationism as propounded by a falsely universalistic humanism, Rosi Braidotti's "nomadic subjectivity," as well as the racial eliminativism advocated by Naomi Zack and others. She tentatively endorses for mixed-race individuals a hyphenated identity that recognizes the particularities of "hybridization" and the fact that individuals in these identities confront gaps that can never be bridged but only negotiated by, as she says of her own Anglo/Latina identity, "standing at one point here, and then there, moving between locations as events or other people's responses propel me," never able to "wholly occupy either the Anglo or the Latina identity." As she says, "What I seek now is no longer a home, but perhaps a lighthouse that might illuminate this place in which I live, for myself as much as for others" (284).
With her nuanced views of these historical variable visible identities and her careful analyses and arguments against the ways alternative conceptualizations have unfolded in history and in philosophy and political theory, Linda Martín Alcoff has indeed, as she hoped, constructed a "bridge"-or at least added considerably to the span on which others have been working for so long-over "the huge gulf that separates races and genders in this country," and not just, as she fears, a "rickety raft thrown on open seas" (xi). 
Amy Allen
Seyla Benhabib's work to date has been characterized both by a sophisticated understanding of the pervasive tensions between universalism and particularism in contemporary political theory and by an admirable refusal of simplistic reductionism in either direction. As she puts it in the introduction to her new book, The Rights of Others, "our fate, as late-modern individuals, is to live caught in the permanent tug of war between the vision of the universal and
